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ABSTRACT
Economic insights are powerful for understanding the challenge of managing a highly infectious disease, such as COVID-19, through behavioral
precautions including social distancing. One problem is a form of moral
hazard, which arises when some individuals face less personal risk of harm or
bear greater personal costs of taking precautions. Without legal intervention,
some individuals will see socially risky behaviors as personally less costly
than socially beneficial behaviors, a balance that makes those beneficial
behaviors unsustainable. For insights, we review health insurance moral
hazard, agricultural infectious disease policy, and deterrence theory, but find
that classic enforcement strategies of punishing noncompliant people are
stymied. One mechanism is for policymakers to indemnify individuals for
losses associated with taking those socially desirable behaviors to reduce
the spread. We develop a coherent approach for doing so, based on conditional cash payments and precommitments by citizens, which may also be
reinforced by social norms.
K E Y W O R D S: COVID-19, moral hazard, behavioral science, public health,

incentives
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In the medium-term time horizon until a vaccine is developed, and perhaps thereafter,
management of the COVID-19 pandemic will largely depend on broad behavioral
changes at the population level. Under a strategy of social distancing, lockdown, or
quarantine, individuals are directed or suggested to exercise precautions including staying home, closing businesses, wearing masks, and avoiding physical proximity to other
persons.1 Presymptomatic patients are a reservoir for spread, but such precautions
depend on them believing that spread is both important and preventable.2 Individuals
have inherent incentives to undertake such measures, because they are self-protective,
reducing the chance of the actor herself becoming infected and suffering. Accordingly,
policymakers can expect a substantial degree of voluntary compliance, as long as the
public receives, and believes, accurate information about the risk. That is, regrettably, a
nontrivial assumption, but that problem is not our focus here.3
Notwithstanding the self-protective effects of these measures, microeconomic analysis suggests a likely market failure, due to heterogeneity in the population. Part of
the heterogeneity is biological—some individuals (eg younger persons and women)
appear less likely to suffer harm from infection, whereas other individuals (eg older
persons, men, and those with other medical conditions) face greater risk of harm if
infected.4 The costs of precaution are also heterogeneous. For individuals who would
otherwise be actively building careers or businesses, searching for romantic partners,
or providing for dependents including children, the costs of staying at home are much
more substantial, compared with others who are already retired from work, settled with
spouses and partners, and no longer have dependents.5 Certainly, the consequences of
loss of life are more dire for the younger as they have more years of life to lose. However,
younger people tend to discount the future more heavily than older individuals and may
not place much value on the additional years of life at risk.6
Perhaps most important, the greatest risk to individuals in this younger group,
particularly teenagers, is the loss of the social interactions through school, sports, and
other activities that are essential to combat depression, among other risk factors for
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Adolescents are Paying a High Price for Covid-19 Prevention, https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/27/
adolescents-young-adults-paying-high-price-covid-19-prevention/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
See Suicide, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/suicide.shtml (suicide is the second leading cause
of death for individuals 10–34 years of age) (accessed June 4, 2020).
Mike Baker, A New Source of Coronavirus Spread: ‘Covid-19 Parties’, NYTimes, May 6, 2020.
See eg W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk (1995).
Flu Vaccination Coverage, United States, 2018–19 Influenza Season FluVaxView Seasonal Influenza (Flu),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage-1819estimates.htm (accessed June 4, 2020).
Survey Reveals Common Misconceptions About Flu, Vaccination, https://www.aafp.org/news/health-ofthe-public/20200122flusurvey.html (accessed June 4, 2020).
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health.7 Suicide and suicide attempts in younger individuals dwarf the magnitude of
risk from COVID-19, which makes the pandemic precautions particularly burdensome
for this population, even if yielding spillover benefits for everybody else.8 Perilously,
young people are starting to venture into ‘COVID-19 parties’ organized, so that people
can mingle with infected people to get the illness ‘out of the way’ and carry on with life.9
In rough terms, for the age gradient in particular, these observations suggest a stark
misalignment of incentives—younger persons personally receive the fewest benefits
from precautions, but suffer the greatest costs of taking them. On the margin, some
individuals will see the personal costs of taking a precaution to be greater than the
personal benefits. The heterogeneity in the population suggests a classic market failure,
known in the law and economics literature as an ‘externality’.10 Those who do not
comply with precautions disproportionally impose the costs of noncompliance on
others, who are more likely to suffer from infection.
Similarly, for seasonal flu where vaccination is a primary precaution, the rate of
vaccination in the 18–49 age bracket has not in recent years exceeded 35%, which is just
over half the rate of older adults.11 In a recent survey, young millennials were the least
well informed about influenza, and the most likely to believe anti-vaccine rhetoric.12
Accordingly for COVID-19, we can expect that for those who can get infected without
bearing healthcare costs, suffering, or unemployment, precautions may seem unnecessary. This is especially true given that persons have private information about their
preventive measures, but may not possess information about whether they are infected.
How can governments effectively regulate this situation in the complex environment
of an infectious disease, like COVID-19? We make the nontrivial assumption that governments can promulgate policies about what activities may be optimal at a given point
in time (ie whether to return to work), but we focus on mechanisms of compliance,
recognizing that many micro-level decisions are difficult for the government to monitor,
much less to enforce.
From a normative perspective, the goals are clear: to minimize the net harm to
aggregate social welfare caused by the pandemic, accounting for both the public health
losses (mortality and morbidity, and the costs of treating or suffering with the same)
and the economic losses associated with taking precautions (lost wages and forgone
consumption of welfare-enhancing goods and services). We generally assume, for the
sake of argument, that certain levels of specific precautions are worthwhile from this
social utility perspective. Yet, for the reasons just stated, the costs and benefits of
taking those precautions are poorly distributed. We do not offer a normative theory
of optimal distribution, but rather a behavioral one: how to align the costs and benefits
of precautions so that the precautions will be sustainably undertaken.
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One mechanism to address that problem is for policymakers to indemnify individuals for losses associated with taking those socially desirable behaviors to reduce
the spread. We discuss a coherent mechanism for encouraging the taking of costly
precautions, which may also be reinforced by social norms.
INSIGHTS FROM HEALTH INSURANCE MORAL HAZARD

13 Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 531 (1968).
14 See generally Christopher T. Robertson, Exposed: Why Our Health Insurance Is Incomplete and What Can Be
Done About It, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, (2019).
15 See eg Andrew Mulcahy et al., Insurance Coverage of Emergency Care for Young Adults Under Health Reform, 368
N. Engl. J. Med. 2105 (2013).
16 Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116–127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020); Health Insurance
Providers Respond to Coronavirus (COVID-19), Am. Health Ins. Plans (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.ahip.org/
health-insurance-providers-respond-to-coronavirus-covid-19/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
17 See eg Luare B. De Preux, Anticipatory Ex Ante Moral Hazard and the Effect of Medicare on Prevention, 20 Health
Econ. 1056–72 (2011).
18 Univ. of Cal., Health Insurance Increases Preventive Care, Not Risky Behaviors, Sci. Daily (Nov. 26, 2013), https://
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/11/131126155912.htm (accessed June 4, 2020).
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The concept of ‘moral hazard’ is that individuals are more likely to take risky or costly
behaviors when those costs are borne by others.13 In health policy, most of the focus
on moral hazard has been in the design of health insurance policy, using deductibles
and copays, to insure that once ill or injured, a patient does not wastefully consume
healthcare.14 That form of moral hazard is sometimes distinguished as ‘secondary’,
or ‘ex post’, after the illness arises. Notwithstanding an overwhelming emphasis in
health policy, the literature suggests that ‘ex post’ moral hazard is a relatively small
driver of healthcare consumption for several reasons, including patients’ lack of agency
in making many of their own healthcare choices in practice.15 Accordingly in the
COVID-19 infectious disease context, where underconsumption is a greater risk than
overconsumption, Congress provided that tests be covered without cost exposures and
insurance companies have largely covered associated treatments.16
In contrast, ‘primary’, or ‘ex ante’, moral hazard applies where individuals who
have healthcare costs largely externalized to the insurance pool may undertake risky
behaviors (eg smoking or skydiving) increasing chances of having an injury or illness in
the first place.17 For health insurance design, primary moral hazard may have a relatively
small effect on risk-taking behavior, because individuals personally suffer many of the
other risks associated with illness or injury (including pain, suffering, lost work, chance
of death).18 These other costs are likely more salient to a person selecting a risky
behavior than is the fact that some of the healthcare costs will be insured.
For the policy of managing infectious disease, primary moral hazard is likely to
be a more important driver of behavior where the chance of suffering any disutility
whatsoever is heterogeneous. In this case, although the risk does not approach zero, it is
as if relative youth provides partial indemnity insurance against not only the healthcare
costs, but also the pain, suffering, lost work, and chance of death that are associated with
COVID-19 infection.
Traditional health insurance policy has conceived healthcare as a cost when a
risk materializes, but healthcare is often itself a precaution against a greater future
risk. Baicker and colleagues have coined the term ‘behavioral hazard’ to refer to the
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INSIGHTS FROM AGRICULTURAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE MORAL HAZARD

In the recent past, few global diseases in human health have been comparable to
COVID-19 with respect to the simultaneous level of transmissibility and pathogenicity.
Yet policymakers are not ‘flying blind’. In other infectious disease contexts, moral hazard
and risk-seeking behavior have been confirmed empirically.
For example, in the UK, policymakers have struggled to manage an outbreak of
bovine tuberculosis.23 The primary policy mechanism is a surveillance program, where
agricultural agents visit farms and test animals for the disease. If it is discovered, the
animal is killed, and the farm is put on a disease-restricted status (like a quarantine
or lockdown) for 60 days.24 The farmers are able to take various costly precautions
(eg maintaining fences, disinfecting trailers) to reduce the risk of infection. One might
suppose that the risks of having beef purchasers reject infected meat, of having an
infected animal discovered and slaughtered, and having the farm put on lockdown
would be sufficient to induce optimal rates of precaution-taking.
However, the policy also includes a provision to indemnify the farmer for the loss
of the infected animal that must be destroyed by law. Forthcoming empirical work
shows that higher levels of indemnity may lead to higher rates of infection likely because
farmers take fewer precautions when facing larger indemnities.25 In this case, the government has in part exacerbated the moral hazard problem, by paying an indemnity that
lowers the farmer’s risk exposure, reducing the inherent incentive he would otherwise
have to keep his cattle healthy. This indemnity is similar to the young, female, otherwise
19 Katherine Baicker, Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein, Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance, 130
Q. J. Econ., 1623–67 (Nov. 2015).
20 J. Frank Wharam et al., Diabetes Outpatient Care and Acute Complications Before and After High-Deductible
Insurance Enrollment: A Natural Experiment for Translation in Diabetes (NEXT-D) Study. 177 J. Am. Med. Assoc.
Int. Med. 358–68 (2017).
21 John A. Nyman, The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance (2003).
22 Susan H. Busch et al., Effects of a Cost-Sharing Exemption on Use of Preventive Services at One Large Employer, 25
Health Aff. 1529–36 (2006).
23 Bovine TB Strategy Review: Summary and Conclusions, Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-strategy-for-achieving-bovine-tuberculosis-free-statusfor-england-2018-review/bovine-tb-strategy-review-summary-and-conclusions (accessed Mar. 5, 2020).
24 Actions Once TB Is Suspected or Confirmed, TB Hub, https://tbhub.co.uk/advice-during-a-tb-breakdown/acti
ons-once-tb-is-suspected-or-confirmed/ (accessed Apr. 12, 2020).
25 See K. Aleks Schaefer, Daniel P. Scheitrum & Steven van Winden, Cruel to be Kind: Moral Hazard in British
Animal Disease Management (accessed June 4, 2020). (working paper on file with authors).
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phenomenon of people declining to consume worthwhile healthcare.19 This body of
research in the health insurance domain demonstrates the more general phenomenon
of how policy may strike the wrong balance, for example, if actors are biased away
from optimal precaution-taking decisions, because the immediate costs of care (eg
copayments for insulin) seem more salient than the longer-term costs (eg treating
neuropathy for uncontrolled diabetes).20 Of course, that problem is exacerbated if the
costs of precaution are so high that individuals simply cannot afford to take them, even
if they would prefer to do so.21 Accordingly, the Affordable Care Act now requires
coverage of certain preventive services without cost exposure at all—indemnifying
the cost of precaution—an approach that may improve welfare and reduce spending
overall.22
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POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND PRACTICAL LIMITS TO OPTIMAL DETERRENCE

In the agricultural settings, the unfortunate policy of indemnifying farmers against the
costs of their failing to take precautions may reflect a constitutional, legal, or political
limit to governmental enforcement. The payment of an indemnity may reflect a political bargain, allowing a relatively intrusive regulatory mechanism, such as mandatory
testing, to be agreeable to the agricultural lobby, if accompanied by a payment from the
treasury to offset some of the costs thereof.27 Similarly, under the US Constitution’s
due process clause, the government must generally compensate individuals for ‘takings’
of their property.28 Moreover, under international commercial agreements, businesses
may enjoy a remedy against excessive regulatory interventions that cause economic
injury.29
More generally, the US Constitution limits the powers of the state and federal
governments to restrict certain liberties, but the Supreme Court has generally upheld
reasonable public health interventions, especially in times of emergency.30 In the 1905
case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a local
Massachusetts law requiring smallpox vaccination.31 The courts have, however, struck
down public health enforcement actions that were motivated by racial animus, or which
were not appropriately tailored to the risks at hand.32
Nonetheless, the government has broad powers in this domain.33 Accordingly,
to enforce orders for social distancing, or staying at home in particular, some
governmental actors made strict orders backed by the coercive power of the state.
26 Id.
27 Vincent H. Smith & Barry K. Goodwin, Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural Chemical Use, 78 Am.
J. Agric. Econs. 428 (1996).
28 US Constitution, amend V.
29 Award on Jurisdiction, Can. Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, N. Am. Free Trade Agreement Arbitration, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0114.pdf (accessed June 4, 2020).
30 Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally—The U.S. Response to Covid-19,
N. Engl. J. Med., Apr. 2020, at 1, ww.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2006740#.Xo9F0JdWHpY.twitter
(accessed June 4, 2020).
31 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
32 Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F.10 (C.C.N.D. Cal., 1900).
33 Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, Covid-19—The Law and Limits of Quarantine, N. Engl. J. Med., Apr. 2020,
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2004211 (accessed June 4, 2020).
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healthy human in the age of COVID-19, who may be less likely to suffer adverse effects
of infection, and thus has reduced inherent incentives to take precautions.
As in human health, a farm experiencing a disease breakdown generates a negative
externality for its neighbors through spatial disease transmission. By taking steps to
minimize the likelihood of a breakdown on her own farm, the farmer also reduces
the likelihood of infection for her neighbors. The indemnity payment relieves the
farm of a portion of the costs of contracting the disease and, by doing so, reduces the
incentive to invest in on-farm biosecurity. Consequently, not only do high indemnity
rates lead to higher rates of disease, directly, by disincentivizing precautionary steps,
but also the spatial feedback effect runs the risk of generating further infections in
the surrounding area.26 Again, the example of animal disease management echoes the
human experience.
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34 Police Across California Issue Citations for Violations of Stay at Home Order, NBC Bay Area (Apr. 5,
2020), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/san-francisco/police-across-ca-issue-citations-for-violati
ons-of-stay-at-home-order/2267942/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
35 See generally, Becker, G. S. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). But see
Hope Corman & H. Naci Mocan, A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug Abuse in New York City,
90 Am. Econ. Rev. 584 (2000) (‘[A]fter 30 years of empirical research there is no consensus on the impact of
police and arrests on criminal activity.’)
36 See generally David M. Kennedy, Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction,
Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon, (2009).
37 See, Brandon D.L. Marshall and Abdullah Shihipar, We Cannot Police Our Way Out of a Pandemic, NYTimes,
Apr. 27, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/opinion/coronavirus-police.html. See generally, Martin H. Pritikin, Fine-Labor: The Symbiosis Between Monetary and Work Sanctions, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 343 (2010)
(describing practical drawbacks of both monetary sanctions and incarceration) (accessed June 8, 2020).
38 See generally Derek A. Westen, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days, 57 Calif. L. Rev.
778 (1969).
39 Stuart A. Kinner et al., Prisons and Custodial Settings Are Part of a Comprehensive Response to COVID-19,
5 Lancet Pub. Health e188 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7103922/ (accessed
June 4, 2020).
40 Id.
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On April 5, for example, police officers throughout the state of California began issuing
citations for those who refused to close businesses or maintain social distance on
beaches.34 If these sorts of citations, or more severe sanctions such as imprisonment,
have a deterrent effect, they may solve the collective action problem.
However, deterrence theory suggests that to be effective, enforcement has to find the
optimal mix between detecting noncompliance and then sanctioning it once found.35
For a rational actor, the risk of suffering the sanction is the product of these two
variables. Although it may be relatively easy for the police to detect and enforce against
business operators and beach goers, it will be much more difficult to detect individuals
who meet to have sex, for example. Similarly the war on illicit drugs has been stymied by
such difficulties of detection.36 Whether such black markets can be kept small enough
to keep infection rates at manageable levels, is a key question.
In this case, deterrence is also stymied by the realities of an infectious disease,
such as COVID-19. Law enforcement typically employs escalating consequences for
violations, starting with the threat of fines and culminating with imprisonment as
the ultimate consequence short of death. Yet, fines may affect communities that have
already been hit hard by the pandemic and are generally hard to enforce, when individuals have little or no funds to pay (a problem known as ‘judgment proofing’).37 Indeed,
the power to fine is ultimately backed by the power to imprison those who refuse to
pay.38
Moreover, prisoners are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 due to overcrowding,
poor ventilation, unsanitary facilities, and poor access to healthcare services.39 Prisons
easily become epicenters of disease, threatening the health and safety of the inmates as
well as the surrounding community.40 Accordingly, on March 26, 2020, the Attorney
General of the USA instructed the Federal Bureau of Prisons to transfer some eligible
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41 William Barr, Department of Justice, Memorandum on Prioritization of Home Confinement as Appropriate in
Response to COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/docs/bop_memo_
home_confinement.pdf (accessed June 4, 2020).
42 Timothy Bella, Inmates tried to infect themselves with the coronavirus to get early release, Los Angeles County
sheriff says, Washington Post (May 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/12/inma
tes-coronavirus-infect-los-angeles/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
43 Tess Riski, Portland Police Will Not Take Misdemeanor Arrests to Jail During the COVID-10 Outbreak, to
Avoid Overcrowding, Willamette Week (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.wweek.com/news/2020/03/20/ppbwill-not-take-misdemeanor-arrests-to-jail-during-covid-19-outbreak-to-avoid-overcrowding/; Matthew
Fultz, Northam Encourages Police to Avoid Arrests, Imprisonment in Wake of COVID-19 Virus, WTVR News
Richmond (Mar. 19, 2020, 11:58 PM), https://www.wtvr.com/news/local-news/northam-encouragespolice-to-avoid-arrests-imprisonment-in-wake-of-covid-19-virus; Ron Wilkins, Coronavirus: Officers Make
Fewer Arrests During COVID-19 Emergency, Lafayette J. & Courier (Mar. 29, 2020, 5:06 PM), https://www.
jconline.com/story/news/crime/2020/03/29/police-make-fewer-arrests-lafayette-area-response-covi
d-19/2920809001/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
44 See eg, Aris Folley, Two Arizona Sheriffs Say They Will Not Enforce Governor’s Stay-at-Home order, The Hill, May
3, 2020 https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/495896-two-arizona-sheriffs-say-they-wont-enforcegovernors-stay-at-home-order (accessed June 4, 2020).
45 See eg Judy Woodruff, Laura Santhanam & Alison Thoet, What Dr. Fauci Wants You to Know About Face
Masks and Staying Home as Virus Spreads, PBS (Apr. 3, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshou
r/show/what-dr-fauci-wants-you-to-know-about-face-masks-and-staying-home-as-virus-spreads#transcri
pt (National Institute for Allergies and Infectious Diseases Director Anthony Fauci interviewed: ‘Q. But
when lives are at stake, why aren’t command measures requiring people to do this appropriate now? A. That
generally is not the way things operate in the relationship between the federal government and the states.’)
(accessed June 4, 2020).
46 Robert C. Ellikson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Harvard University Press: Cambridge,
MA (1994); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ.
Rev. 519 (1983); Eric Posner, Laws and Social Norms, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA (2002).
47 Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 63 (1992).
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inmates from prisons to home confinement.41 Some prisoners have reportedly even
tried to get themselves infected, as a basis for then getting early release.42
Thus, governments are hamstrung in how they are able to enforce compliance with
social distancing and quarantine requirements. Fines are regressive and imprisoning an
individual violating quarantine guidelines would be counterproductive as they could
introduce the disease into a particularly vulnerable population where the chance of
spread is high. Governors and law enforcement agencies have dramatically reduced
arrests.43 By May 2020, some local governments were already refusing to enforce ‘stayat-home’ orders for political, ideological, or other reasons.44 Hence, governments will
have to look beyond the threat of fines and imprisonment to compel compliance with
precautionary measures.
These difficulties may explain why, in March and April 2020, the USA saw private
actors merely encouraging people to take precautions, and even some governmental
actors, such as state governors, who had the power to exercise the coercive role of
the state, declined to do so, in favor of mere exhortation and encouragement.45 The
literature on ‘private ordering’ and the broader literature on social norms, together
suggest that individuals may provide socially desirable behaviors, even when it is
not compelled to do so under strict rationality.46 Economics literature suggests the
possibility of repeated interactions with individuals and the threat of social retaliation
may be sufficient to establish and uphold social norms (ie ‘don’t burn bridges’).47
For instance, adherence to government recommendations to social distance may be
achieved simply through the universal fear of loss of status or reputations if one is
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Economic and behavioral insights are powerful for understanding the problems inherent in managing a highly infectious disease, but what do they recommend as solutions?
The overarching principle is to make it easier (ie less costly) for individuals to take
reasonable precautions than to not take reasonable precautions.
In this essay, we are primarily focused on regulatory mechanisms prior to a vaccine
becoming available. However, the American experience with vaccine mandates is illustrative of our economic and behavioral analysis so far. Consider a parent’s choice about
whether to vaccinate her child prior to COVID-19. Her state may nominally require
vaccination unless an exemption applies, but an indifferent or harried parent may find
it easier to scribble her name on an exemption form rather than go to the hassle of
finding a pediatrician, making an appointment, and securing the vaccination. Indeed,
scholars have found that vaccination rates vary substantially depending on the proce48 Liza Lin, Coronavirus Rule Breakers Draw Public Ire Online, WSJ, Mar. 28, 2020.
49 See eg Ariz. Rev. Stat. tit. 9, ch. 8, § 1–101.10 et seq. https://www.azdhs.gov/documents/preparedness/epide
miology-disease-control/food-safety-environmental-services/az-food-code.pdf (accessed June 4, 2020).
50 See Toni Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1880 (1991).
51 S. Nathan Park, Cults and Conservatives Spread Coronavirus in South Korea, Foreign Pol’y (Feb. 27,
2020, 10:45 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/27/coronavirus-south-korea-cults-conservativeschina/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
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discovered to disregard recommended behavior. In Hong Kong and elsewhere, internet
users shamed people they believed had flouted lockdown orders, traveled, or socialized
recklessly during the pandemic.48
Vendors may also voluntarily embrace precautions to burnish their own reputations
for safety. For COVID-19, government directives were initially crude—just a binary
decision to allow businesses to remain open (if essential) versus mandate closure
(if not). Yet, the market responded innovatively: in some ‘essential’ stores, there were
no limits on the number of shoppers in the store, no systematic disinfection of carts or
baskets or checkout counters, no masks or other protective equipment of store personnel, and the like. Conversely, some stores voluntarily created waiting lines outside the
store, with tape demarcating 6 foot intervals, allowing entry into the store only with exit
of another shopper, thoughtful distancing of carts from other shoppers on checkout,
a designated position for the customer while items are scanned, and more. Stores may
have enacted voluntary precautions in hopes of boosting business by being seen as a safe
place to shop, reducing liability exposure in the event of infected employees, or simply
to minimize the chance of disease spread for safety reasons. Eventually, governments
may catch up to prescribing the sort of granular policies for managing COVID-19 as
they have, for example, for handling food-borne illness in foods.49
Yet, reputational sanctions tend to work best when used against members within
identifiable groups, such as a close-knit religious or ethnic community, but can cut
against compliance of formal rules.50 In communities in which government authority
conflicts with strong social norms or fear of loss of status or reputations, governmental orders can also be harder to enforce. It has been reported that an important
factor contributing to the outbreak in South Korea included mistrust by a close-knit
community.51
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physicians to the medical board if they issue too many such exemptions.) (accessed June 4, 2020).
54 Nir Eyal, Paul L. Romain & Christopher Robertson, Can Rationing Through Inconvenience Be Ethical?, 48
Hastings Ctr. Rep. 10 (2018).
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Med. 543–571 (2016).
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ndrums/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
57 See Robertson supra note 55.
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dure required to invoke such an exemption.52 For example, in 2011 Washington State
implemented a requirement that parents have a counseling session with a physician
prior to securing such an exemption, and exemption rates went down by 40%.53 In
addition to any information delivered, these requirements function as behavioral speed
bumps for the parent, with the inconvenience (ie non-monetary cost) serving to ration
the scarce resource of non-vaccinated parents.54 In this way, the precaution is made less
costly than not taking the precaution.
For COVID-19, when a vaccine is available, it may begin as a scarce resource to be
rationed across many people desiring it, but once it achieves a certain saturation, there
will likely remain a minority of persons who resist vaccination, unless properly incentivized. The USA has generally focused only on childhood vaccinations, but strategies
for incentivizing adults will then be required as well. For example, participating in some
valuable but risky activities, such as airline travel, could be conditioned on vaccine
compliance.55
Returning to our focus on the prevaccine era, in order to diminish the negative
impact on the economy and citizens’ finances, some governments are considering
issuing ‘immunity certificates’ to individuals who have recovered from the disease and
are presumed to be immune from reinfection as well as unable to spread disease.56
These individuals with immunity certificates would then be able to re-enter society and
resume their employment as well as patronize businesses and continue participating
in the economy. Assuming that fundamental questions regarding immunity can be
answered affirmatively by medical science, and that a technological solution can be
employed to ensure validity over counterfeiting concerns, such a policy could then
receive support in judicial review, as discriminating against those with and without
immunity, not unlike the way extant and potential policies discriminate against those
who are unvaccinated.57
Still, this sort of certificate policy could backfire, especially as it creates an incentive
to contract the disease—a ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card, creating a risk of community
spread, prior to the hypothesized benefit of immunity being secured. Intentionally
seeking out disease like in the form of ‘COVID-19 parties’ has precedents in the form of
‘chicken pox parties’ in order to obtain immunity as a young child as well as the concept

Indemnifying precaution

•

11

58 Chickenpox Transmission, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/chickenpox/abou
t/transmission.html (accessed Dec. 31, 2018); Hugh Klein, Generating, Stealthing, and Gift Giving: The
Intentional Transmission of HIV by HIV-Positive Men to Their HIV-Negative Sex Partners, 2 Health Psychol. Res.
64 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4768590/ (accessed June 4, 2020).
59 See William Vickrey, Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An Economist’s Critique, 33
Law & Contemp. Probs. 464 (1968) (explaining why fault is unnecessary for regulation).

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article-abstract/7/1/lsaa032/5848134 by guest on 29 July 2020

of ‘gift giving’, the intentional transmission of HIV.58 Unless the infection is secured in
controlled conditions (eg exposure followed by 2 weeks of quarantine), the net effects
may be negative overall.
This analysis suggests that the immunity certificates policy could exacerbate the
same moral hazard problem, which already discourages some people from taking
reasonable precautions. This problem may be overstated, to the extent that individuals
are already actively flouting stay-at-home orders, immunity certificates may do little to
alter their private risk calculus toward less precaution.
Thus, the primary concern is the population on the margin, who otherwise would
have abided by shelter-in-place and social distancing, but due to immunity certificates,
will be tipped toward reckless behavior. Those who are extremely financially insecure,
those who perceive themselves to not be at risk of serious adverse consequences of the
disease, or those who believe contracting COVID-19 is inevitable have an incentive to
eschew precautionary measures and seek out the disease in order to shorten the length
of time they are out of work. This problem reinforces the more fundamental need,
discussed below, to further indemnify individuals who are taking precautions, including
through substantial increase in unemployment compensation, as already beginning in
the CARES Act (discussed below).
Speaking more broadly, while the immunity card solution allows identification of
individuals who are no longer disease susceptible, it fails to solve the primary imperfect information problem—identifying who is contagious. Expanded testing capacity
and faster tests would allow for more direct targeting of the moral hazard problem.
Improved testing would dramatically reduce the need for population-wide ‘shelter in
place’ strategies. Under this scenario, quarantine restrictions could be limited only to
individuals that test positive and their contacts.
This strategy imposes the economic costs of contagion on precisely the right individuals—those that are contagious. And unlike the immunity card strategy, it does
not create a perverse incentive to become infected, but rather imposes the costs of
quarantine on those who become infected. Note that such an analysis need not suggest
that all individuals who become infected are in some way at ‘fault’ for having become
infected (though some may have been, if they failed to take reasonable precautions to
avoid infection). Once infected due to any cause, in economics jargon, the infected individuals generate a negative externality, and, thus, they are the appropriate population
to be isolated.59 Regardless of the source of infection, it may then be unreasonable for
such a person to engage in activities that risk harm to others. We also emphasize below
that the individuals under targeted quarantine could be compensated for the private
costs of quarantine through private or public insurance programs.
A test-and-quarantine strategy would allow the economy—susceptible and immune
individuals alike—to resume normal life while actively and effectively mitigating
the spread of the disease. Of course, this targeted quarantine strategy still requires
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compliance with guidelines to stay at home on the part of the COVID-19-positive
individuals. Compliance may be achieved more easily in this scenario as subjects
of quarantine will know the restrictions are temporary. Additionally, because those
quarantined have tested positive or come in contact with a positive case, they will face
more severe social pressure to avoid contact with others.
However, unless widespread testing could be implemented and made mandatory
(at least conditional on certain risky behaviors), other imperfections in the healthcare
system confound this strategy. If tests were not mandatory, symptomatic individuals
could simply avoid testing so as not to be detected as a positive case and removed from
employment. For instance, those who are financially insecure and without any sickleave program that would provide compensation during the quarantine period would
have incentive to avoid the test to prevent loss of income.
For COVID-19 across all these particular policy tactics, the fundamental mechanism must be to reduce the costs associated with individuals taking precautions, so
that the net individual cost of precaution is lower than not taking the precaution.
The most costly form of precaution is to stay home from work. One obvious solution
is to effectively indemnify persons who lose income due to lost work. Prior to the
COVID-19 crisis, this was a weakness of US policy, compared with other industrialized
countries, which tend to have robust provisions for paid sick leave and unemployment
insurance. For people who actually lose their jobs, unemployment insurance in the
USA pays for up to 26 weeks and is even then capped to cover only a portion of prior
income.60 In one study, those receiving unemployment insurance only recouped half
of their lost wages on average.61
The $2 trillion package passed by Congress in mid-March provides a one-time
payment at about $2400 plus $500 per child for most families (and less or none for
others).62 It is worthwhile that these payments went to both workers and nonworkers, because even nonworkers face substantial disutilities in complying with social
distancing protocols.
However, for workers at least, the payments are far from sufficient to indemnify
the costs of precaution: the median American family would need about $5000, to
compensate for a single lost month of work.63 Additionally, the USA has increased
weekly unemployment benefits by $600.64 Even with the increased weekly payment
for the unemployed, the benefit may end in the near future and it does not scale with
income to the detriment of those living in high cost-of-living areas.65 This suggests that
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noncompliance will remain a very substantial problem (not to mention the substantial
disutility suffered by those under the current income shock and the larger economic
effects due to contraction).
Of course, with broader public spending on income replacement and broader compensation for taking precautions, someone must pay those costs. As younger persons
today may be disproportionately taking precautions for the sake of protecting older
persons (as we suggest in the introduction), it may not be sensible to use deficit
financing, where younger persons would ultimately bear those costs. However, we set
aside the point of intergenerational justice.
Behaviorally, it may be more sensible to distribute the burdens across current taxpayers more rationally. Current US tax policy is relatively flat, unlike the wartime era of the
1940s, when marginal tax rates went as high as 94% for the highest-income earners.66
We cannot here make a comprehensive case for the optimal tax policy, recognizing
complications like tax avoidance.67 However, it remains true that wealthier individuals
suffer less disutility for each dollar expropriated through taxation, compared with
poorer individuals who suffer greater deprivations on the margin.68 This ‘diminishing
marginal utility’ of money (as it is known in the economics literature) suggests a
substantial opportunity to reallocate the costs of precaution to minimize the disutility.
Most importantly, this special pandemic situation inverts some of the classic arguments
against progressive taxation as undermining incentives to work.69 Here, the rush to get
back to work may impose more social costs (in terms of infections) than social benefits
(in terms of economic productivity).
In this way, government payments to those who are complying with social distance
or quarantine protocols are designed to indemnify them against the costs of taking
those prosocial precautions. Of course there is a risk of mismatch—people receiving the payments who are nonetheless not complying with distancing/quarantine
guidelines.
To make the bargain more explicit, the payments could be made conditional on
agreeing to comply with stay-at-home or social distancing orders. Given the extensive literature on the deep evolutionary basis of reciprocity for human behavior, we
hypothesize (subject to testing) that such an explicit promise to comply as a reciprocal
condition of accepting funds (a ‘carrot’ strategy) may have behavioral advantages over
other (‘stick’) forms of enforcement, such as fines or imprisonment.70
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Our point is not about the cost of noncompliance (assume equal probability of
detection and an equal-size penalty), and we are not suggesting a differential framing according to prospect theory (in both cases it may be framed as a loss conditional on noncompliance, rather than a gain).71 Rather, asking individuals to explicitly
commit to compliance as a condition of accepting payment reinforces a social norm of
compliance.72 Moreover, the breaking of the promise creates a cognitive dissonance,
which itself may be experienced as a disutility.73 The explicit promise and size of these
payments are likely to make them more effective than the sorts of small fines that may
have perverse effects.74
In addition to self-policing by people feeling motivated to keep their own promises,
compliance may be buttressed by other members of the public shaming those who do
not comply or even reporting them to authorities, because they represent not only
a hypothetical risk for infection but also expropriation of public funds. In this way,
the noncompliance can also be connected to standard law enforcement mechanisms,
where an individual convicted of violating a legitimate order suffers revocation of the
payment as a penalty, with full due process protections of course. Even with such a
standard (rational) deterrence theory, the explicit promise to forfeit the funds upon
noncompliance may make that risk seem more salient to the citizen and thus increase
compliance.
Overall, these economic and behavioral principles suggest that to manage a pandemic prior to dissemination of a vaccine, policymakers should use conditional payments to encourage compliance with social distancing, stay-at-home, and quarantine
directives. The key is to make compliance easier and cheaper than noncompliance,
especially for those that would otherwise feel the greatest compulsion to not comply.

